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COMMENTARY 
REVITALIZING THE CONSUMER PRODUCT 
SAFETY COMMISSION 
Carl Tobias• 
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), having recently 
celebrated its sixteenth birthday, no longer can claim to be a young 
agency. On October 27, 1972, Congress created the Commission to protect 
individuals from deaths and injuries caused by dangerous or defective 
consumer products.1 Yet the CPSC, as it approaches maturity, has failed 
to fulfill numerous purposes for which Congress established it. 
Congress acted at the instigation of the National Commission on 
Product Safety, an entity it created in 1967 to assess risks posed by con-
sumer products and to ascertain whether consumers needed new protec-
tions to reduce harm attributable to those products.2 The National Com-
mission conducted a thorough analysis and issued a Final Report during 
1970 in which it found that unreasonable product hazards exposed the 
public to undue risk and that existing safeguards, such as federal and 
state consumer product safety legislation, manufacturer self-regulation, 
and common law tort suits, were insufficient.3 Accordingly, the Commis-
sion recommended that Congress create an agency with substantial power 
to regulate consumer products.4 Congress followed that suggestion by es-
tablishing the CPSC as an independent regulatory commission and en-
dowing it with authority to regulate some ten thousand products manu-
• Professor of Law, University of Montana. Thanks to Bob Adler and Peggy Sanner for 
valuable suggestions and to the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that 
remain are mine alone. 
1. See Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
2051-2083 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). For analyses of the CPSC's creation and of the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) which created it, see Scalia & Goodman, Procedural As-
pects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. REV. 899 (1973); Schwartz, The 
Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade, 51 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 32 (1982). 
2. See Joint Resolution to Establish a National Commission on Product Safety, Pub. 
L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466 (1967). For discussions of the National Commission's creation 
and its work, see Scalia & Goodman, supra note 1, at 900-01; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 36-
41. 
3. See NATIONAL CoMM'N ON PROD. SAFETY, FINAL REPORT PRESENTED TO THE PRESI-
DENT AND CONGRESS 1-3 (1970). 
4. See id. at 3. 
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factured and distributed by more than one million businesses.11 The 
agency, created in the hope that federal regulation would reduce signifi-
cantly product risks, has not achieved this goal.6 
The CPSC's efforts have seemed star-crossed from the outset. All of 
the problems plagued it that attend creation of any governmental agency, 
such as identifying constituents and setting priorities. 7 Congress assigned 
the CPSC statutory responsibilities that were difficult to accomplish and 
procedures for implementing them which could not be applied efficiently.8 
The most important illustration of these phenomena was the process 
for promulgating consumer product safety standards, compulsory safety 
requirements to be imposed on manufacturers.9 Congress saddled the 
CPSC with relatively novel, untested procedures for setting those stan-
dards, and the procedures ultimately proved extraordinarily complex and 
time-consuming.10 The agency admirably attempted to carry out its statu-
tory obligation to develop safety standards, but the Commission commit-
ted a number of mistakes. 
The CPSC decided to develop mandatory standards for several prod-
ucts, such as swimming pool slides, for which the requirements were only 
marginally necessary because the products presented little danger or were 
amenable to treatment with voluntary standards.11 Correspondingly, it 
tried to develop complex compulsory standards for other products, such 
as lawn mowers, which posed risks that could not be remedied easily with 
mandatory requirements.12 Moreover, the Commission laudably at-
tempted to maximize public participation in those initiatives and was one 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (1976) established the CPSC. For figures on the number of 
products and businesses, see Schwartz, supra note 1, at 43. 
6. Congress fashioned the CPSA as a thorough regulatory system "to protect the pub-
lic against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products." See 15 U.S.C. § 
2051(b)(l) (1976). 
7. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 76; Tobias, Great Expectations and Mismatched 
Compensation: Government Sponsored Public Participation In Proceedings of The Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 1101, 1161 (1986). 
8. For the most comprehensive assessment of these difficulties, see Schwartz, supra 
note 1. 
9. For thorough analysis of the "offeror" process for developing these standards, see 
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 57-95. For examination of the seven offeror proceedings con-
ducted to develop the standards, see Tobias, Early Alternative Dispute Resolution in a 
Federal Administrative Agency Context: Experimentation with the Offeror Process at the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409 (1987). 
10. For descriptions of the procedures and the difficulties entailed in employing them, 
see Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory 
Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 Tux. L. REV. 1329, 1400-01, 1412-16 
(1978); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 57-68, 75-77. 
11. For an analysis of the proceedings to develop standards for matchbooks, swimming 
pool slides, television receivers, and miniature Christmas tree lights, finding that the prod-
ucts presented little danger or were amenable to treatment with voluntary standards, see 
Tobias, supra note 9, at 437-58. 
12. For analyses of the lawn mower proceeding which reach the conclusions in the 
text, see Schwartz, supra note 1, at 77-94; Tobias, supra note 9, at 424-37. 
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of the most solicitous federal agencies in this respect. 13 Even that effort, 
however, haunted the CPSC, as neither producers nor consumers could 
resist the temptation to provide ever-increasing amounts of input, which 
complicated already prolix proceedings. 14 
Some of these attempts to write safety standards, which cost the 
agency hundreds of thousands of dollars and certain industries much 
more, resulted in no standards or led to requirements that afforded little 
additional protection for the public.15 The standard-setting endeavors 
and considerable additional Commission activity which occurred from the 
agency's inception until approximately 1978 made the CPSC appear less 
effective than it was and undermined the agency's credibility at a critical 
juncture in its brief existence. 16 
The Commission was rejuvenated in the late 1970s, however. The 
CPSC improved its standing by redefining the agency's focus, especially 
in deciding to develop fewer mandatory standards in-house while encour-
aging manufacturers' organizations, such as trade associations, to upgrade 
voluntary requirements.17 Nevertheless, the Commission's comparative 
success was relatively short-lived, ending roughly with the advent of the 
Reagan administration. 
The difficulties which the CPSC experienced in its early years were 
exacerbated by developments that occurred during the second half of the 
13. See Adler, From "Model Agency" To Basket Case: Can the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission Be Redeemed?, 41 ADMIN. L. REv. 61 (1989); CPSC Oversight: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the House Comm. on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., !st Sess. 351 (1977) (statement of Professor Hamilton) 
[hereinafter 1977 House Oversight Hearings]. 
14. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 75, 95; 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 
13, at 349-55 (statement of Professor Hamilton). For analysis of the difficulties an agency 
can create when it is too open to public involvement, see Statler, Let the Sunshine In?, 67 
A.B.A. J. 573 (1981). 
15. The CPSC spent more than $800,000 attempting to develop standards for public 
playground equipment. See Tobias, supra note 9, at 460. Cf. Tobias, supra note 7, at 1138 
(non-offeror attempt to develop standards for chain saws cost industry more than $1,000,000 
and the Commission more than $500,000). The agency ultimately failed to promulgate any 
standards for television receivers, miniature Christmas tree lights, or public playground 
equipment. See Tobias, supra note 9, at 451, 455, 460. Courts invalidated certain compo-
nents of the architectural glass, matchbook, and swimming pool slide standards that were 
promulgated. See id. at 419, 439, 447. This meant that these, and especially the swimming 
pool slide standard, offered the public little additional protection. See United States CPSC, 
Statutory Rule Review Report to Congress 19-21 (May 1980) (pool slide standard offered 
minimal safety benefit and was anti-competitive). 
16. For analyses of considerable additional CPSC activity, especially relating to its 
procedures, which made it appear Jess effective and undermined its credibility, see Adler, 
supra note 13, at 70-73; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 45-55, 68-70, 94-95. Both of these au-
thors indicate the CPSC may not have deserved criticism and attribute its perceived ineffec-
tiveness to factors for which CPSC was not responsible or could not control, such as Con-
gressionally prescribed procedures. See Adler, supra at 70-73; Schwartz, supra at 62-67, 75, 
95. 
17. This development has been attributed to the leadership of CPSC's Chairman, Su-
san King. See Adler, supra note 13, at 73-74. 
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agency's existence. The Reagan administration's anti-regulatory perspec-
tives directly contravene much embodied in CPSC's statutory mandate.18 
Thus, since the early 1980s, the emphases at CPSC, as at many other 
federal agencies, have been on deregulation, cooperation with manufac-
turers, voluntary controls and voluntary compliance, "prosecutorial dis-
cretion" (not to sue those who may be violating the law), and information 
and education campaigns.19 Symptomatic of this anti-regulatory climate 
was resolution of the all-terrain vehicle (ATV) "problem."2° For several 
years, the CPSC "negotiated" with manufacturers, even as the agency ac-
knowledged that with each month which passed the vehicles would be 
responsible for an additional twenty deaths, ten of which would be chil-
dren. 21 At the instigation of the Justice Department, the Commission fi-
nally entered into an unprecedented "consent decree," which permitted 
the continued sale of four-wheel ATVs while requiring manufacturers to 
institute safety education campaigns for riders and cease production of 
three-wheel ATVs.22 
Critics should not ascribe what has happened at the CPSC during 
the 1980s solely to the Reagan administration. Congress also bears sub-
stantial responsibility for the developments. In 1981, it amended the 
agency's organic statute in ways that make the standard-setting proce-
dure so complex that it is virtually unworkable.23 Moreover, Congress 
18. These anti-regulatory perspectives are reflected in initiatives commenced at the 
inception of the Administration, such as issuance of Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 
(1981) and creation of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief. Indeed, the Administration 
attempted to abolish the CPSC. See Letter from David Stockman, Director, Office of Man-
agement and Budget, to Senator Robert Kasten, Chairman, Consumer Subcommittee of the 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (May 8, 1981). Congress re-
jected this effort. See H.R. REP. No. 99-377, 99th Cong., !st Sess. 7 (1985). 
19. These phenomena are particularly troubling at agencies, such as the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency and the Food and Drug Administration, which like CPSC, have im-
portant responsibilities for protecting public health and safety. For analysis of the efficacy 
of education programs, see Adler & Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Education Cam-
paigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation?, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 159 (1984). 
20. These are off-road vehicles which initially were used by ranchers as general-pur-
pose work machines but which have enjoyed sales exceeding 500,000 vehicles in each of the 
last several years because of advertising portraying them as recreational vehicles for the 
family. 
21. As numerous inexperienced drivers operated the vehicles, the number of deaths 
rose substantially, from 26 in 1982 to 268 in 1986. During 1986, 85,000 injuries requiring 
emergency room treatment were ascribed to ATVs. See Government Asks Limits on All-
Terrain Vehicles, N. Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1987, at Al. 
22. See United States v. American Honda Co., Inc., Civ. Act. No. 87-3525 (April 27, 
1988); see also Buckley and Rooney, All-Terrain Vehicles, 24 TRIAL 56 (Nov. 1988); Egan, 
Roar in the Wilderness Raises Ire Over Vehicles, N. Y. Times, July 15, 1988, at A12. An-
other casualty of anti-regulatory perspectives at CPSC and other agencies has been reim-
bursement of the public for costs incurred when participating in administrative proceedings. 
See Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: Resolving the Issue of Agency Au-
thority to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative Proceedings, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 
906 (1982). 
23. See Consumer Product Safety Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 
Stat. 703 (1981). For analysis of the amendments, see Klayman, Standard Setting Under 
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participated willingly with the administration in mandating large budget 
cuts that would have crippled the CPSC, even had it wanted to act more 
vigorously. 24 
The agency, on its sixteenth birthday, stands wounded, as do 
thousands of Americans whose injuries from defective or dangerous prod-
ucts might have been prevented by a CPSC more attentive to its respon-
sibilities. Many possible constructive measures exist to revitalize the 
Commission in the near future, however. The new administration and the 
new Congress should revise the agency's powers and streamline its proce-
dures, especially for standard setting,211 while restoring sufficient appro-
priations to facilitate the CPSC's effective accomplishment of its difficult 
but important missions.28 President Bush should nominate and the Sen-
ate should confirm commissioners more committed to implementing vig-
orously the agency's statutory obligations.27 Moreover, Congress and the 
CPSC must think constructively about novel ways of promoting increased 
product safety, such as developing incentives for manufacturers that 
evince a commitment to reducing risks posed by their products.28 Those 
measures should enable the CPSC to achieve more efficaciously the task 
of protecting the American people from dangerous and defective prod-
ucts, the purpose for which the agency was created. 
the Consumer Product Safety Amendments of 1981-A Shift in Regulatory Philosophy, 51 
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 96 (1982). 
24. The most drastic cut came in the 1982 fiscal year budget when CPSC lost 25% of 
its appropriations and staff. Since then, CPSC's budget has remained relatively the same so 
that for fiscal year 1989 it requested the same amount as for fiscal year 1982. 
25. For suggestions as to possible revisions, see Adler, supra note 13, at 82-129; 
Klayman, supra note 23. For suggestions relating to revival of participant reimbursement, 
see Tobias, supra note 7, at 1163-64. 
26. It is difficult to pinpoint a precise figure that would be appropriate; however, one 
target might be the level in constant dollars at which CPSC was funded in its first budget 
for fiscal year 1974 (CPSC's request for 1989 represents a 59% drop). 
27. I am not saying that appointees necessarily must be "pro-regulation." Rather, pro-
tecting the American people from dangerous and defective products should be their top 
priority. For discussion of "reluctant regulators," see Adler, supra note 13, at 76. 
28. Manufacturers frequently complain that safety does not sell or pay. 
